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| Author/Contributor(s): |
Schelling, Thomas C
|
| Publisher: |
Harvard University Press
|
| Date: |
05/15/1981
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| Binding: |
Paperback
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| Condition: |
NEW
|
A series of closely interrelated essays on game theory, this book deals with an area in which progress has been least satisfactory--the situations where there is a common interest as well as conflict between adversaries: negotiations, war and threats of war, criminal deterrence, extortion, tacit bargaining. It proposes enlightening similarities between, for instance, maneuvering in limited war and in a traffic jam; deterring the Russians and one's own children; the modern strategy of terror and the ancient institution of hostages.
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